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FIRST ARGUMENT IMPRESSIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT*
Stuart M. Riback**
For a lawyer who only occasionally argues an appeal the
most disconcerting thing about the Supreme Court is that it is
truly a court of last instance: It cannot be reversed on appeal. I
never realized before my first appearance at the Supreme Court
just how comforting it is in day-to-day litigation to know that,
although I always want to win on every issue, there is someplace
to seek a better result if things don't go my way. It had never
occurred to me that I relied on this premise, but when I got to
the Supreme Court, its absence loomed large. This was a
sobering experience, especially at the end of a road that had until
then been very successful.
THE CERT-WORTHY CASE

After a weeklong trial, my firm's client, Samara Brothers,
had established to the jury's satisfaction that the defendant, WalMart, had either copied or connived in copying from Samara's
line of children's clothing. On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld
all of Samara's copyright claims as well most of its trade dress
claims, with the result that Samara's recovery after appeal was
about ninety-five percent of the district court judgment. So after
a smashing victory at trial and a ruling by the Second Circuit
that resulted in my client keeping almost all the money the jury
had awarded, I was reasonably sure that the case was all but
over.

* © 2003 Stuart M. Riback. All rights reserved.
** Stuart M. Riback is a member of Siller Wilk LLP, a law firm in New York. Mr.
Riback's practice concentrates on litigation of commercial, financial, intellectual property,
and creditors' rights disputes.
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True, the Second Circuit had split two-to-one, and the
dissenter was Judge Newman-possibly the most well-respected
judge on the Second Circuit bench at the time. And the
adversary was Wal-Mart, which had a well-deserved reputation
of never surrendering, ever, and fighting most cases to the bitter
end, almost irrespective of the merits. But it is conventional
wisdom that motions for rehearing are almost never granted, that
the Second Circuit grants en banc rehearings about as often as
the planets align, and that the Supreme Court grants certiorari
even more rarely than that. So my partners and I were relatively
optimistic.
Little did we know.
Wal-Mart moved for rehearing and for en banc review, as
we expected. The motion was denied (also as we expected), and
Wal-Mart then filed a cert petition asking the Court to hear five
different issues, which amounted to pretty much all those on
which Samara had won below. It seemed highly unlikely the
Court would consider that sort of petition. I drafted and filed an
opposition to cert, and then put the matter out of my mind.
I didn't think about the case again until the Friday before
the first Monday in October, when I called the Supreme Court
Clerk's office to ask how I could go about ascertaining the
disposition of the cert petition once the Court convened on
Monday. I was told to call on Monday at about 11:00. So I did.
And I was dumbfounded when I learned that the Court had
granted cert. What is more, the Court had formulated its own
question that it wanted the parties to address-one that differed
from those the parties had characterized as the issues in the
case.
I was not surprised that it was the trade dress issue that the
Supreme Court wanted us to address. In retrospect, perhaps we
should have realized that it was a good candidate for the
Supreme Court. First, there was uncertainty in the circuits,
several of which had been wrestling mightily to make sense of
the Supreme Court's 1992 Two Pesos decision in cases where
the claimed trade dress was in the appearance of the item rather
1. The question the Court framed appears in note 4, infra.
2. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, hIc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). Two Pesos held that a
plaintiff did not have to prove secondary meaning if the claimed trade dress was inherently
distinctive.
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than in its packaging. They had enunciated a number of different
standards that, upon analysis, seemed to me to be not that
dissimilar, though each circuit formulated its standard in
different language. And there had not been all that much
opportunity for case law development, because only a bit over
six years had elapsed between Two Pesos and the Second Circuit
ruling in Samara. But the lower court cases and the scholarly
commentary were increasingly noting splits of authority and
differing standards, and apparently the Supreme Court took
these mentions seriously. Second, although the facts of the case
had seemed to us to be hopelessly tangled, the facts did not seem
the least bit complicated to the Supreme Court because, after all,
there was a jury verdict. (Two Pesos was an appeal after a jury
verdict as well.)
One thing I could not understand, though-and still
don't-is why the Supreme Court ordered what it called
"expedited" briefing. It turns out that expedited briefing is
actually quite leisurely by lower court standards. The Court
directed Wal-Mart to file its brief in about six weeks. We would
have something less than five weeks to file ours, and WalMart's reply was due three weeks after that. Oral argument was
set for January 19, 2000, about ten days after the last brief was
due.
GETTING A FEEL FOR THE COURT

I had never been in the Supreme Court before. I had not
appeared there as an attorney, and I had not even been in the
courtroom. I had to apply for admission to the Supreme Court
bar in order to sign our opposition to cert. I had only a vague
idea of what sort of merits brief the Supreme Court expected,
what kinds of arguments each of the justices would find
convincing or what sorts of authorities (besides Supreme Court
opinions) the Court would deem persuasive. Clearly I would
need help.
I initially turned to an attorney I knew from when we had
both been young associates in our first law firm jobs. He had
clerked in the Second Circuit and Supreme Court, and had spent
a sizable stint in the Solicitor General's office. Now a partner in
the Washington office of a national law firm, he seemed
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genuinely happy to learn that I would be appearing in the

Supreme Court, and was pleased to offer his assistance. In the
course of our conversation I also learned a few very interesting
facts about the small coterie of attorneys who make a large part
of their living practicing before the nation's highest court. For
one thing, it's a very competitive practice. The Supreme Court's
caseload has shrunk to the point that getting an opportunity to
argue before the Justices is increasingly considered a rare prize.
Yes, there is still a lot of business in writing cert petitions and
oppositions to cert, but that is hardly as sexy or as interesting as
standing at the lectern fielding questions from the Justices. So I
was interested to learn that certain firms with Supreme Court
expertise offer a lower price to the client if the firm's Supreme
Court specialist does the argument. Simply working on the
papers without doing the argument costs more. Apparently, the
prestige and the thrill of an oral argument in the Supreme Court
are, to some firms, worth several thousand dollars.
In the end, I could not engage this attorney to help me
because his firm had done some work for Wal-Mart. (I saw no
reason to go through the process of getting the conflict waived;
it was much easier and quicker to go elsewhere.) We were
referred to a fine appellate lawyer at Howrey & Simon, Mark
Levy, who had also spent several years in the Solicitor General's
office and had argued some fifteen cases in the Supreme Court.
I met Mark in person for the first time in early November,
when I made a trip to Washington to watch the Court in action. I
thought it would be important, before preparing my argument, to
get a feel for the courtroom, to watch how the Justices reacted to
different advocates on different issues, and to see which Justices
were aggressive questioners, which Justices probed most deeply,
and which areas of inquiry seemed most interesting to which
Justices. Making the trip in early November was dictated by the
calendar-it was the only time after cert was granted that the
Court was in session and I wouldn't be busy working on writing
the brief. So on the afternoon of November 1, 1999, I got on the
Metroliner in New York, and I arrived at the Supreme Court
bright and early the next day to watch the arguments.
I discovered that attorneys who are members of the
Supreme Court bar do not have to wait on line to get one of the
relatively few seats that are available to the general public.
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Instead, a few rows of seats are set aside just for members of the

Supreme Court bar. These seats are immediately behind the
counsel tables, so I had a pretty good view of the Justices and
the attorneys. The best view, of course, is from the lectern: It is
very, very close to the Justices-so close that when the arguing
attorney looks straight ahead, he or she can actually see the
whites of the Chief Justice's eyes. I was also struck by how
small the courtroom is. It is imposing and grand, but still small
in scale; my layman's estimate is that it holds somewhat more
than 300 people, perhaps 350, with not a lot of room left over.
I spent two mornings watching arguments, and saw nine
different lawyers argue. (In one of the four cases I watched, the
Solicitor General appeared in support of one side, so there were
three attorneys on that case.) The exercise was illuminating, but
perhaps not as illuminating as it might have been had I read the
briefs ahead of time. The Justices, of course, were very well
prepared-they had read the briefs and the record, and clearly
had given some extensive thought to the issues before the
arguments. Although the Justices were scrupulously courteous to
counsel, their questions were pointed and creative, and they did
not countenance any evasiveness, or any answers that were less
than complete and responsive. As my friend the former Assistant
Solicitor General had warned me, these are very smart, very
well-prepared people, and they will push you as hard as any
other judges in the country, and often harder.
PITCHING THE ARGUMENT AND WRITING THE BRIEF

After the second day of arguments I went to Mark Levy's
office, and the two of us talked about the case. He was only
generally familiar with the Lanham Act, but I was impressed
with how quickly he picked up the issues and was able to jot
down his ideas about the approaches he thought we should work
on. (Of course, as the work proceeded over the ensuing weeks,
he became a lot more familiar with the Lanham Act.)
When I asked where I should be looking for authority
besides Supreme Court precedents and legislative history, Mark
had the list at his fingertips. He recommended interpretations by
the federal agency that enforces the statute. In our case that was
the Patent and Trademark Office. He suggested using the
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ranking treatises and law review articles. Cases from the Courts
of Appeals could be used as well, but he reminded me that
typically the Supreme Court doesn't pay all that much attention
to them, though they do give more credence to opinions by
certain judges than to others. I was pretty familiar with who the
most respected judges are, and I knew that one of them was
Judge Newman, the dissenter from the Second Circuit opinion in
my case.3 On the other hand, the PTO's position was not that far
from mine, and from the bit of reading I had done, the
commentators were all over the map on this issue, so I was
confident there would be supporting authority. By the time Mark
and I were finished talking, I could see that the Supreme Court
brief would look not like the briefs I was used to writing as a
lawyer, but instead like the legal writing I had done back when I
was in law school-it would look like a law review article.
I'll spare you the details about the process of writing the
brief. I do have some observations about how to pitch a case to
the Supreme Court, though-at least, how to pitch a statutory
case. (In constitutional cases the Justices have other
considerations.) The biggest difference from normal litigation
briefs is that the facts matter virtually not at all. The Supreme
Court couldn't care less about the facts. It wants to think only
about law, the more abstractly the better. If the Court thought
the facts were in issue, it probably would not have taken the
case. While I can't say the factual portion of the brief is beside
the point, I do think making fact-based arguments is futile, and
just takes up precious pages within the page limit. The Supreme
Court grants cert for the purpose of making a pronouncement on
the law. The equities of the particular case are beside the point.
(In my case, Wal-Mart had used up some space in its brief
arguing a few factual issues, which compelled me to respond.
While I did get to say in the brief almost everything I wanted to
say on the legal issues, it took time to edit the brief down to the
fifty-page limit. If I hadn't been required to deal with the fact
issues, the editing would have been less arduous.) There
certainly are cases where the Court has seized on factual issues
3. Another was Judge Edward Becker of the Third Circuit, who also had authored an
opinion extremely unfavorable to my position. At least the opinions in this area by Judge
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, perhaps the most respected appellate judge in the
country, were susceptible of a favorable reading.
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as a way to avoid making a decision, but generally the Court
wants to decide the issue that it deemed cert-worthy in the first
instance, so it will treat the facts as having been already decided.
The Court generally tries to reach a result that makes sense
to it, even if normal technical legal standards and reasoning
might point the other way. This was something Mark told me
very early on: Common sense is at a premium. To take my case
as an example, we had some cogent technical legal points. WalMart argued to the Supreme Court that product designs can
never be inherently distinctive. It had not raised that argument in
either of the lower courts, and indeed, no court had ever held
such a thing since Two Pesos. In theory, that should have been a
bar to having the Supreme Court consider that position on
appeal, for parties are generally not permitted to raise new
arguments for the first time on appeal. Not only that, but the
question the Supreme Court had asked the parties to brief
actually assumed the opposite of what Wal-Mart's position was. 4
In other words, the Supreme Court assumed that product designs
could be inherently distinctive; it just asked the parties to
enunciate an appropriate test. Finally, the language of Two
Pesos is specifically addressed to inherently distinctive product
designs Ultimately, though, the Court decided that product
designs tended not to be inherently source-indicating, and thus
adopted Wal-Mart's approach, despite the Court's initial
assumption to the contrary, despite the language of Two Pesos,
and despite Wal-Mart's failure to raise the issue below.
The Court's ruling in Samara was a pure policy decision,
informed by the Justices' ideas of what seemed to them to be
good common sense. I have commented elsewhere on the
difficulties with the opinion,6 and will not belabor the matter
here. For current purposes, suffice it to say that a number of
trademark practitioners have told me that the result in my case
was hardly inevitable, though probably defensible, but that the
reasoning in the opinion was conclusory in the extreme, and thus

4. The question the Court framed was: "What must be shown to establish that a
product's design is inherently distinctive for purposes of Lanham Act trade-dress
protection?" Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 528 U.S. 808, 808 (1999).
5. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 772-73.
6. Stuart M. Riback, Product Design Trade Dress: Where Do We Go From Here? 90
Trademark Rep. 563 (2000).
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highly unsatisfactory. I agree with them on both scores. The
lesson here is that, at least in non-constitutional cases, probably
the best posture is to make your client's position seem utterly
common-sensical, as opposed to correct in a narrow legal sense.
Sometimes that can be difficult for lawyers.
I also have concluded that oral argument has little effect on
the Justices' thinking. Of the six cases in which I observed
arguments (the four cases argued in November and the two on
the day I argued), I noted very little correlation between the
advocates' skill in argument and the ultimate results. Some of
the more impressive oral advocates lost, and the attorney I
thought was the least effective oral advocate won. It is clear to
me, therefore, that the lawyer's main opportunity to persuade the
Justices is in the brief. Oral argument is useful, though, in
helping the Justices to sharpen their thinking. It rapidly becomes
clear from the questioning that, to the Justices, there is no better
advocate than another of the Justices. They pay attention to one
another's questions, and use questions as a way to make points
to each other.
One aspect of Supreme Court practice that I had not
thought about was the need to do lobbying. During the several
weeks between the time cert was granted and the time I received
Wal-Mart's brief, I spent several hours on the telephone
speaking with the Solicitor General's office to try to persuade
the Solicitor General to support my position, and several hours
trying to line up businesses willing to submit amicus curiae
briefs supporting us. I was surprised at the outcome of both
these efforts.
The Solicitor General's office submitted a brief that
nominally supported Wal-Mart, urging the reversal of the
Second Circuit. His ten minutes of argument would
consequently come out of Wal-Mart's time, but the legal
standard the Solicitor General was advocating was almost the
same as ours, so he and I would be advocating essentially the
same legal standard at oral argument. True, the Solicitor General
disagreed with us about whether applying that standard required
an affirmance or a reversal. Realistically, though, Mark and I
were pretty sure that, no matter what the Supreme Court
decided, it would likely send the case back to have the Second
Circuit figure out how to apply the law to the facts. So we cared
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less that the Solicitor General was advocating reversal than that
his view of the law was close to ours. That meant our view of
the case would have forty minutes of argument to Wal-Mart's
twenty.
Because we were advocating a broad reading of the
Lanham Act, I thought owners of well-known trademarks would
be interested in supporting Samara's position before the
Supreme Court. I was surprised to find that just about no one I
called wanted to join in an amicus brief. They all wished me
well, and most of them said they hoped I would win, but none
wanted to join the brief. I later learned why: They simply did not
want to use part of their legal department's budget on an amicus
brief so long as someone else was advocating the position they
supported. They felt that they could get the same benefit without
spending the money.
In the end, Steve Trattner, a well-known trademark lawyer
who had litigated the issue before at the appellate level,
assembled a group of companies that submitted an amicus brief.
The roster of companies on the amicus brief was composed
largely of those that had litigated the issue in the various
circuits.7 It even included Taco Cabana, Inc., the prevailing
plaintiff in Two Pesos. Steve teamed up with Bartow Farr of
Farr & Taranto, a respected Supreme Court practitioner, to
submit a brief that supported my client's position almost right
down the line. Bartow's partner, Richard Taranto, had argued
and won the Two Pesos case, so the Farr & Taranto firm had a
history with the issue. It was no surprise that Steve and Bartow
produced a good, well-written brief whose arguments, though
overlapping considerably with mine substantively, were cast in a
somewhat different, and very appealing, way.
In all, six amicus briefs were submitted in addition to the
brief from the Solicitor General. Three supported Wal-Mart's
position and one supported Samara's position. The remaining
two, from the American Intellectual Property Law Association
and the International Trademark Association, were nominally in
support of neither party but advocated a legal position very
7. These included, among others, the plaintiffs in Ashley Furn. Id., Inc. v.
Sangiacomno, N.A., 187 F.3d 363 (4th Cir. 1999); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, 155 F.3d
526 (5th Cir. 1998); hInagineering, Inc. v. Van Klassens, Inc., 53 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir.
1995); and L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. v. CanalDover Furn. Co., 79 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 1996).
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similar to Samara's and the Solicitor General's. It was
interesting to see the lineup of parties: Mass market discounters
and knock-off merchants supported Wal-Mart; high-end and
niche merchants supported Samara; and the AIPLA and INTA
advocated what they thought was the intellectually honest
position. In the end though, I'm not sure the amicus briefs had
much impact on the Court. The Court's opinion referred to none
of them other than the Solicitor General's.
PREPARING FOR THE ARGUMENT

The actual argument experience was not nearly as stressful
as I thought it would be. Several weeks before the argument, an
appearance sheet arrived in the mail from the Supreme Court
clerk's office. The sheet asked for some basic information,
including one question that I had never before seen on any
court's forms: It asked how to pronounce my surname. I never
make an issue when people pronounce my name differently
from the way I pronounce it, because the pronunciation of my
name is not obvious from its spelling. (I pronounce "Riback" as
"ree-back." It is very common for others to call me "ryeback.") But it was very nice to have the Chief Justice of the
United States summon me to the lectern of the Supreme Court
using the same pronunciation of my name that I use. It
underscored for me the courtesy that the Court extends to the
attorneys who appear before it.
Two weeks before the argument I started outlining the
various points that I thought important to raise with the Court. I
made lists of questions, weak spots, and areas that Wal-Mart's
attorney was likely to hammer on. These notes grew to an
enormous volume of stuff, far more than I could possibly use in
my

thirty

minutes. Mark's

advice

was to

prepare

two

presentations. One should be about a minute long, consisting of
what it was absolutely crucial for the Justices to hear me say.
The reason is that the Justices generally start asking questions
about a minute into the argument, so the only opportunity to say
something without interruption is in that first minute. The
second presentation, he suggested, should be about five minutes
long, and I should expect that it would take the entire thirty
minutes to go through it, because the Justices would be
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constantly asking questions. I held off preparing the two
presentations until after I went through a moot court, because I
wanted first to get a sense of how a court would react to my
words and how to order the many points in priority rank.
I had heard different opinions about whether to do one
moot court session or two. I could see merit to either position.
Ultimately, I decided to go with Mark's suggestion that one
should be enough. He thought it would be better to do one long
moot court, with aggressive questioners who had read the briefs
and thought about the issues, a week or so before the argument.
That would give me a baptism by fire, subjecting me to a real
ordeal, but would still give me enough time to assess my weak
spots, shore up arguments that needed shoring up, and tighten
my presentation. A second moot court would probably end up
being repetitive (if done with different judges) or descend into a
discussion of minor details (if done with the same judges).
The next issue was who would be a moot court judge. One
possibility was to ask people who hadn't worked on the case at
all and would be looking at it with fresh eyes. Another was to
use trademark practitioners, who would know which questions
to ask. I thought about what I wanted the moot court to
accomplish. I wanted to be tested mercilessly, so I wanted
judges who would question aggressively. But I also did not want
the judges to be limited by the specialist's perspective of
trademark lawyers, who would likely approach the issues
differently from the Justices, to whom the Lanham Act is just
one statute among many. I wanted a generalist's point of view
because, after all, the Justices themselves are generalists. They
don't focus on one area of law. So overall, I wanted a
combination of trademark expertise and appellate expertise. To
get that most efficiently (after all, a client was paying for this), I
looked to the people who were already up to speed in the case
and wouldn't have to read the briefs anew as a stranger to the
case would have to: Mark Levy and Bartow Farr, who both
know the Supreme Court quite well and had deep knowledge of
appellate practice, and Steve Trattner, who knew trademark law
as well as anyone, and had actually handled appeals on this
issue. To round out the panel, Bartow's partner, Richard
Taranto, who had argued and won Two Pesos, also joined us.

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

We held the moot court in the second week of January in
Howrey & Simon's moot court room. The interrogation lasted
two and a half hours, and it ended only because I was losing my

voice and getting out of breath. As I had hoped, the questioning
was brutal and relentless, and went after every weak spot in my
arguments. Through it all I worked to keep calm, bearing in
mind that the Supreme Court's interrogation would likely be
more polite, though possibly more probing. At only one point
did I have to step out of character to talk to the panel as friends
rather than judges. But it was clear to me when we were done
that I had plenty of work to do.
The panelists confirmed what I thought were the areas that
needed work. After the moot court, we sat around in the room
for about another hour and discussed the argument. I took notes
furiously, interrupted only by the occasional break to sip a soft
drink and munch on something. By the time I finally boarded the
Metroliner for the trip back to New York that evening, I was
exhausted. I sat on the train with the laptop open, staring at my
argument notes and not doing a thing with them. Finally I shut
the computer and just closed my eyes. When I got home, I went
straight to sleep.
Of course I worked through the weekend. By the time I got
on the train for Washington on Monday afternoon, I was just a
bit short of where I wanted to be. Mark had been kind enough to
set aside a room at Howrey & Simon's offices for me to work in
during the next day, and he periodically checked on me to see
how I was doing. I think he believed I was overdoing it, but
didn't want to dissuade me from doing what I thought I needed
to do.
Finally at about four o'clock I called it quits, packed up,
and went for a very long walk. When I got back to the hotel, my
wife and daughter were there waiting for me. I couldn't have
been happier to see them: Spending the rest of the evening with
them was a welcome change of pace from thinking about such
matters as how the functionality doctrine interfaced with
inherent distinctiveness in the context of product designs. We
had a fine dinner at a restaurant near Dupont Circle and took the
Metro back to the hotel. To my surprise, I slept quite well.
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BEFORE THE ARGUMENT

At about 8:30 the next morning, the Samara team gathered
in the lobby of the hotel. The CEO had flown in from Australia
for the argument. The President came down from New Jersey.
My partner Steve Siller had come as well. And of course, my
wife and daughter were there. Outside it was gray and cold, so
we bundled up for the walk over to the Supreme Court.
We entered the Supreme Court building on the Maryland
Avenue side. I had my pass as arguing counsel, so I had no
trouble getting in. The remainder of our contingent were "guests
of the Marshal." As arguing counsel, I was allotted space for six
guests to attend the argument. But the Marshal considers them
his guests. So someone from the Marshal's office escorted them
to the courtroom. I was escorted to an elevator that took me to
the attorneys' lounge.
Mark, who also got a counsel's pass, was waiting for me
when I got off the elevator. He had argued in the Supreme Court
many times before, so he knew the lay of the land and took me
around to look at parts of the building that the public almost
never sees. He showed me the Supreme Court law library, and
brought me to the room adjacent to the attorneys' lounge, where
the Assistant Solicitors General were. Mark introduced me to
Larry Wallace, who would be arguing for the Solicitor General.
Larry had been in the Solicitor General's office for years, and by
that time had earned the distinction of having argued more cases
in the Supreme Court than any other attorney in history, having
surpassed the legendary John W. Davis not long earlier. I had
heard that lawyers from the Solicitor General's office wear
morning coats when they argue, and sure enough, Larry Wallace
was decked out in full formal regalia. (The Assistant Solicitor
General who had argued the case I watched in November had
been a woman, and I was trying to remember whether she was
wearing some form of formal attire as well. I just couldn't
remember, though I suspect she wasn't, because I probably
would have noticed if she was.) I also made sure to greet Bill
Coston of Venable Baetjer, who was representing Wal-Mart. He
was there with his partner Ken Bass, the appellate expert at his
firm.
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After the introductions and pleasantries were over and we
were directed to sit, the Marshal addressed the group of lawyers
who would be sitting at the counsel tables for the two cases to be
argued that day. "I'm Bill Suter," he said, and he gave us the
basic ground rules for arguing in the Supreme Court, most of
which I already knew because they were set forth in the
materials the Court sends to counsel: Don't introduce yourself;
the Court knows who you are. Start with "Mr. Chief Justice, and
may it please the Court." Don't ask how much time you have
left. When the red light goes on, stop. Counsel in the first case
sit at the front counsel table, and counsel in the second case sit at
the second counsel table, and when the first argument is over,
the counsel from each of the cases switch places. I remember
being relieved when the Marshal said it's okay to leave to go to
the bathroom if need be, though at the same time I knew I
couldn't imagine getting up from the counsel table to go to the
restroom with a full courtroom watching.
One other thing hit me while the Marshal was talking.
Mark had suggested bringing a candy bar or something I could
pop into my mouth right before walking into the courtroom.
Because I was the respondent in the second case, I would be the
last attorney presenting argument. There would be at least an
hour and a half of proceedings before I would stand at the
lectern. "It can be a long morning," Mark had said. "Be sure
you have the energy you need." As the Marshal was talking, I
realized that with all the other preparation I had to do, I had
overlooked the snack. But as things turned out, it was just as
well. I was in adrenaline overdrive and could have done the
argument even had I not eaten for a week.
After the Marshal finished his talk, we had a few minutes
before going into the courtroom. Mark asked me, "How are you
feeling?" It was a good question. I was actually surprised at how
I was feeling. I wasn't the least bit nervous. In fact, I felt
precisely the opposite: an unexpected feeling of calm. I don't
remember answering Mark's question. I just smiled and nodded,
and the two of us headed into the courtroom.
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THE ARGUMENT

We walked in at about ten minutes to ten. I was struck by
how crowded the room was. I suspected that the crowd hadn't
come to hear Bill Coston and me argue about whether product
designs can be inherently distinctive, and I was right. They had
come to hear the case before ours. Hill v. Colorado8 involved a
challenge to a Colorado statute that had been passed to keep
anti-abortion protesters at least eight feet away from people
going into clinics. 9 Nothing guarantees a full house at the
Supreme Court the way a case even remotely connected to
abortion does (nothing, that is, other than a case about a
contested presidential election, which at that point was still
almost eleven months in the future).
That isn't to say Wal-Mart v. Samara had attracted no
spectators. Steve Trattner was sitting immediately behind me, in
the row of seats that had been set aside for members of the
Supreme Court bar. He had with him other attorneys interested
in the case, including counsel for some of the amici. I later
learned from Bill Coston that Wal-Mart had brought up a large
contingent of in-house lawyers from its headquarters in
Arkansas. So it's not like our case had no spectators. Still, when
the argument in Hill was over, a large part of the audience got
up and left.
Bill Coston started his argument while the hubbub was still
going on, and the Chief Justice seemed annoyed at the noise. It
didn't get to the point where he said anything about it, though,
and shortly after Bill began the room quieted down. I took
furious notes as Bill spoke. I noted every concern every justice
had, and fortunately I had answers for everything. It was
interesting, though, that they didn't seem to go very hard on Bill.
Justice O'Connor seemed to think Wal-Mart was out of luck,
and for a while, so did a couple of other Justices. The big
concern they had was with whether Wal-Mart's position would
8. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
9. One thing that stayed with me from the Hill argument was the plaintiff's counsel's
observation that the distance from the lectern to the bench-from the attorney to the Chief
Justice-was just eight feet. I have no idea whether that is accurate, and my own estimate
is that it's about ten feet. But I do know that when I did finally stand at the lectern, I was
able to look the Chief Justice right in the eyes, almost as if in normal conversation. The
lectern is that close to the bench.
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require overruling Two Pesos. They kept coming back to that

over and over again.
The Justices went much harder on Larry Wallace. The
Solicitor General's brief didn't tell the Court what the result
would be, only what the standard should be, and it
recommended a remand to the Second Circuit to have the
standard applied. That did not sit well with the Justices at all.
They wanted answers, and good ones. They kept after Wallace
to explain himself. He struggled, but couldn't quite explain why
he couldn't just take a position on what the outcome of the case
should be, especially since his legal theory looked an awful lot
like Samara's. He did say that the government was skeptical of
Samara's position, but would not say that the case should have
been decided differently. (On reflection I think the government's
skepticism is what doomed my position. The Solicitor General
and I were espousing pretty much the same legal test, but I came
out one way and he came out another, which convinced the
Court that the test wasn't much of a test at all.)
When Wallace was done, the Chief Justice summoned me
to the lectern. "Mr. Chief Justice," I began, looking straight at
the Chief Justice, "and may it please the Court," I continued,
looking at the other Justices. I then launched into my one-minute
presentation. That was probably a mistake. I should have started
by rebutting what I thought was Bill Coston's strongest
argument. I figured I would get to it, but about fifty seconds into
my presentation I was interrupted by a question, and after that
the questions continued to come, one after another, for the next
twenty-eight minutes. I never did get to say what I wanted to
say. The five-minute presentation went unused.
One thing I remember about the argument is how focused it
is possible to be. When I was done with the argument, I was
amazed at how quickly the time had gone. It was the fastest
thirty minutes I can remember. I do not think I had ever been
absorbed in a concentration so total as when I was responding to
the Justices' questions. I was, in fact, coached to avoid looking
at the clock above the Chief Justice's head, but now I can't
imagine how anyone could even think to do that. The entire
experience of the argument is so enveloping that I barely even
looked at my notes, much less at the clock. In fact, I wished I
had more time because there was plenty more I wanted to say.
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I remember too that the lectern is so close to the bench that
when a Justice asks a question, it's often necessary to turn to
face the speaker to hear the question and answer it. Justice
Breyer, who sits at the far right-hand side of the bench, was an
active questioner that day, so I was turning a lot. I don't
remember being asked any questions by the Chief Justice or by
Justice Stevens, who were more or less straight ahead, nor by
Justice Thomas, who was next to Justice Breyer, but I think I
had to reply to a question from every other Justice. My standing
so close to the bench made the argument feel almost like a
conversation, similar to the bull sessions I had with friends in
law school, where we sat around discussing legal issues. The
Justices did not seem the least bit remote. It's hard to seem
remote when you are close enough to look someone right in the
eye.
About twenty-nine and a half minutes into the argument
there was a lull in the questioning, and I realized I didn't have
enough time to make another point, so I just thanked the Court
and sat down. Bill had reserved two minutes for rebuttal, but it
seemed like the Court had heard enough. When he finished and
returned to his seat, the Marshal called for all to rise while the
Justices filed out. That was it. It was all over now except for the
waiting.
I can't really say the aftermath was a letdown. I thought I
had handled myself pretty well in front of the Court, and my
client agreed. Several trademark lawyers who were in the
audience also told me they thought my argument was effective. I
knew a couple of the Justices didn't like my position at all, and
others seemed somewhat sympathetic. Others were hard to read.
More than one person had told me that oral argument doesn't
affect much, so I knew at a logical level that I shouldn't have
been trying to figure out what each Justice was thinking.
Realistically, though, it's human nature to want to read the tea
leaves. So I was going over the argument in my mind all the way
back to New York on the Metroliner. It didn't help.
Just over two months later, I got a call from a reporter,
asking me to comment on the Supreme Court's opinion. I hadn't
been aware that the Supreme Court had ruled. I scrambled to get
online to get the opinion. It was only then that I learned the
Supreme Court had ruled against my client. I spent the rest of
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the morning on the telephone, taking calls and making calls and
trying to figure out what our next steps were. While I was on the
phone, a message was left on my voice mail from the Clerk's
Office at the Supreme Court, advising me what the outcome
was, that the opinion was available, and that a slip opinion
would be sent to me in the mail. The Clerk apologized for not
calling earlier.
Now that time has given me some perspective on it, I have
to say that the experience was very taxing, that it required very
hard work, and that it had a disappointing outcome. It was still
one of the most exhilarating experiences of my life. Having
done it once, I'd certainly like to do it again. And next time, I
intend to win.

